In a March 14, 2025 decision by the Georgia Court of Appeals, A24A1255. Kadiri v. The State, the court reversed a conviction due to the trial court’s failure to properly instruct the jury on the statute of limitations and the State’s failure to present sufficient evidence proving that the prosecution was commenced within the required time frame. This case serves as a critical reminder of the importance of procedural diligence in criminal prosecutions, particularly in DUI cases, and highlights potential defenses that skilled DUI attorneys can leverage to protect their clients’ rights.

Case Background

In Kadiri v. The State, the defendant, Kadiri, was charged with crimes (likely including DUI-related offenses, though specific charges are not detailed in the opinion). Kadiri requested a jury instruction on the statute of limitations, arguing that the State had not proven that the prosecution was initiated within the applicable time frame under Georgia law. The trial court denied this request and subsequently denied Kadiri’s motion for a new trial, leading to an appeal.

The Georgia Court of Appeals, in an opinion written by Judge Hodges, reversed the trial court’s decision, finding that the failure to provide the requested jury instruction was reversible error. Judge Hodges also wrote a concurring opinion, fully agreeing with the majority but emphasizing the State’s procedural failures that undermined the prosecution.

Key Legal Issue: Statute of Limitations

The statute of limitations is a fundamental principle in criminal law that sets a time limit within which the State must initiate prosecution. For most misdemeanor DUI charges in Georgia, the statute of limitations is two years from the date of the alleged offense (O.C.G.A. § 17-3-1(d)). For felony DUI charges, such as those involving serious injury or death, the statute of limitations is typically four years (O.C.G.A. § 17-3-1(c)). If the State fails to commence prosecution within this period, the case must be dismissed.

In Kadiri, the State presented evidence of when the alleged crimes occurred but failed to offer proof of when the prosecution began. This omission was critical because, as Judge Hodges noted, “The State was required to offer evidence or proof that the crimes charged occurred within the applicable statute of limitation” (citing Lee v. State, 289 Ga. 95, 97 (2011)). Without such evidence, the jury could not determine whether the prosecution was timely, making the requested jury instruction on the statute of limitations essential.

The State’s Procedural Failures

Judge Hodges’ concurrence highlights several ways the State could have met its burden but failed to do so:

1. Original Accusation: The State could have introduced the original accusation showing the date prosecution commenced, proving it fell within the statute of limitations.

2. Amended Accusation: The amended accusation could have included the date of the original filing to establish timeliness.

3. Uniform Traffic Citations: In DUI cases, uniform traffic citations often serve as the initial charging document. The State could have introduced these citations, provided they contained sufficient detail about the offense (tracking the language of the relevant statute), to demonstrate timely prosecution.

4. Other Evidence: The State had numerous other options to show when prosecution began but failed to utilize any of them. Instead, the only evidence in the record regarding the prosecution’s timeline was the amended accusation, which, on its face, suggested the crimes occurred outside the statute of limitations. This oversight left the jury without the necessary information to evaluate the timeliness of the prosecution, undermining the integrity of the guilty verdict.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred by:

1. Failing to give Kadiri’s requested jury instruction on the statute of limitations.
2. Denying Kadiri’s motion for a new trial based on this issue.

As a result, the conviction was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. Judge Hodges’ concurrence emphasized that this outcome could have been avoided had the State exercised greater care in presenting evidence to meet its burden of proof.

Implications for DUI Defense in Georgia

The Kadiri case underscores the importance of the statute of limitations as a potential defense in DUI cases. As a Georgia DUI attorney, I frequently encounter cases where the State fails to adhere to procedural requirements, including timely prosecution. This ruling provides several key takeaways for defendants and their counsel:

• Demand Evidence of Timeliness: The State bears the burden of proving that prosecution was initiated within the statute of limitations. If the State cannot produce this evidence, the case may be subject to dismissal.
• Request Jury Instructions: When the statute of limitations is at issue, defense attorneys should request a specific jury instruction to ensure the jury understands its role in evaluating the timeliness of the prosecution.
• Scrutinize the Record: In Kadiri, the amended accusation suggested the prosecution was untimely. Defense attorneys should closely examine all charging documents and evidence to identify procedural defects.

Why This Matters for DUI Defendants

For individuals facing DUI charges in Georgia, the Kadiri decision reinforces the importance of working with an experienced DUI attorney who understands the intricacies of criminal procedure. A skilled attorney can identify and exploit procedural errors, such as those related to the statute of limitations, to secure a dismissal or reversal of a conviction. This case also serves as a cautionary tale for prosecutors, urging them to ensure their cases are built on a solid procedural foundation to avoid wasting judicial resources.

What does it mean if a member of the three judge panel concurs both fully and specially.

In Georgia, the binding nature of an opinion from the Georgia Court of Appeals depends on several factors, including the type of opinion, the level of agreement among the judges, and whether the opinion has been superseded or overruled by higher authority (such as the Georgia Supreme Court). When a judge "concurs fully and specially," as in A24A1255. Kadiri v. The State, it does not inherently render the opinion non-binding. However, there are specific circumstances under which an opinion from the Georgia Court of Appeals, including one with a special concurrence, may not be considered binding precedent. Below, I’ll explain this in detail.

Understanding Opinions and Precedential Value in Georgia

The Georgia Court of Appeals is an intermediate appellate court tasked with reviewing trial court decisions. Its opinions generally serve as binding precedent for lower courts (trial courts) in Georgia, unless overruled by the Georgia Supreme Court or contradicted by statute. However, not all opinions from the Court of Appeals are binding, and the presence of a special concurrence can influence how the opinion is interpreted or applied.

Types of Opinions

1. Majority Opinion: The majority opinion reflects the court's official ruling and reasoning, typically written by one judge and joined by a majority of the panel (at least two of three judges in a three-judge panel). This opinion is binding precedent unless limited by other factors.

2. Concurrence: A concurring opinion agrees with the outcome of the majority (e.g., affirming or reversing the trial court) but may offer different or additional reasoning.

• • Regular Concurrence: A judge agrees with both the outcome and the reasoning of the majority but may write separately to emphasize a point or clarify an issue.
  • Special Concurrence: A judge agrees with the outcome but disagrees with some or all of the majority’s reasoning, providing an alternative rationale for the decision.

3. Dissent: A dissenting opinion disagrees with the majority’s outcome and reasoning and is not binding.

Binding Precedent in Georgia

Under Georgia law, only opinions that meet certain criteria are considered binding precedent:

• Full Court Agreement: For an opinion to be binding, it must reflect the agreement of a majority of the judges on the panel (typically two of three in a three-judge panel) on both the outcome and the reasoning.
• Physical Precedent: If there is no majority agreement on the reasoning (e.g., one judge joins the outcome but not the reasoning), the opinion may be considered "physical precedent only," meaning it is not binding on lower courts but may still be persuasive.

Special Concurrence and Its Impact

When a judge "concurs fully and specially," as Judge Hodges did in Kadiri v. The State, the judge agrees fully with the majority’s outcome and reasoning but writes separately to provide additional commentary, concerns, or an alternative perspective. This type of concurrence does not inherently undermine the binding nature of the majority opinion. However, there are situations where an opinion with a special concurrence may not be binding precedent:

1. Lack of Majority Agreement on Reasoning:

• • If the special concurrence disagrees with the majority’s reasoning (even partially) and provides a different rationale for reaching the same outcome, the opinion may not be binding if another judge joins only the outcome and not the majority’s reasoning. For example:
    • Judge A writes the majority opinion (outcome + reasoning).
    • Judge B concurs fully with the outcome and reasoning.
    • Judge C concurs fully with the outcome but writes a special concurrence with different reasoning.
    • In this scenario, there is a majority (Judges A and B) agreeing on the reasoning, so the majority opinion remains binding.
  • However, if Judge B only joins the outcome and not the reasoning, and Judge C writes a special concurrence with different reasoning, there is no majority agreement on the reasoning. The opinion becomes "physical precedent only" and is not binding.

2. Physical Precedent Designation:

• • • Georgia Court of Appeals Rule 33.2(a)(2) provides that if a majority of the panel does not agree on the reasoning, the opinion is designated as "physical precedent only." Physical precedent is not binding on lower courts but may be cited as persuasive authority.
    • In Kadiri v. The State, Judge Hodges explicitly states he "concurs fully with the majority’s correct and well-written opinion," indicating agreement with both the outcome and reasoning. Thus, the majority opinion in this case appears to be binding unless other factors (e.g., a third judge’s dissent or partial concurrence) undermine the majority’s reasoning. The provided excerpt does not indicate such a situation, so we assume the opinion is binding.

3. Unpublished or Non-Precedential Opinions:

• • Some opinions are designated as unpublished or non-precedential under Court of Appeals Rule 33.2(b). These opinions are not binding, regardless of concurrences. However, the excerpt from Kadiri v. The State does not indicate it is unpublished, and the case number (A24A1255) suggests it is a published opinion, which typically carries precedential weight unless otherwise limited.

4. Subsequent Developments:

• • An opinion may lose its binding effect if it is overruled by the Georgia Supreme Court, contradicted by statute, or distinguished in later cases. A special concurrence highlighting concerns (as Judge Hodges did) may invite scrutiny or reconsideration in future cases, but it does not immediately render the opinion non-binding.

Application to Kadiri v. The State

In Kadiri v. The State, Judge Hodges’ special concurrence explicitly states that he "concurs fully" with the majority’s opinion, agreeing with both the outcome (reversing the trial court) and the reasoning (the trial court erred by failing to give the requested jury instruction on the statute of limitations and denying the motion for a new trial). His special concurrence focuses on additional concerns about the State’s procedural failures, urging prosecutors to present evidence proving timely prosecution. This does not conflict with the majority’s reasoning but supplements it with a call for greater diligence.

Assuming the panel consists of three judges and the other two judges joined the majority opinion fully (as is typical unless otherwise stated), the majority opinion in Kadiri is binding precedent because:

• There is a majority agreeing on the outcome and reasoning.
• The opinion is not designated as "physical precedent only" or unpublished based on the available information.

Thus, the presence of Judge Hodges’ special concurrence does not, by itself, render the opinion non-binding. It remains binding precedent unless:

• Another judge on the panel concurred only in the judgment (outcome) and not the reasoning, reducing agreement on the reasoning to less than a majority.
• The opinion is explicitly designated as non-precedential under Court of Appeals rules.
• It is later overruled or distinguished by the Georgia Supreme Court or a subsequent Court of Appeals decision.

A Georgia Court of Appeals opinion is not automatically non-binding simply because a judge concurs fully and specially. The binding nature depends on whether a majority of the panel agrees on both the outcome and the reasoning. In Kadiri v. The State, Judge Hodges’ full concurrence with the majority’s opinion suggests it is binding precedent, assuming the other judges also fully joined the majority. However, if the opinion lacks majority agreement on the reasoning or is designated as "physical precedent only," it would not be binding. Based on the provided excerpt, there is no indication of such limitations, so the opinion likely serves as binding precedent for lower courts in Georgia.

Contact George Creal for Expert DUI Defense

George Creal is a seasoned DUI lawyer based in Georgia, dedicated to defending clients against DUI charges with expertise and compassion. Visit www.georgecreal.com or call 404-333-0706 to learn more

Disclaimer

The information in this blog post is for general informational purposes only and should not be construed as legal advice. Please consult with an attorney to discuss your specific legal situation.